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I. INTRODUCTION
Capitalism benefits consumers when and only when there is
competition.' Firms compete with each other to provide consumers
with choices by lowering prices and improving their respective
products or services.2 Competition is the glue that keeps firms and
consumers mutually benefiting each other.3  Without competition
there is no choice and consumers become vulnerable to corporate
greed and incompetence.4 Antitrust law, or competition law, ensures
capitalism works for consumers by addressing the temptations of
firms to merge with, collude with, or destroy their competitors
instead of outperforming them.5
* J.D. Candidate, 2010, Pepperdine University School of Law. B.A.,
Economics and a Minor in Business Administration from the University of
Southern California, Los Angeles. Special thanks to my parents for their love and
support. Thanks also to Pepperdine and all of my professors who have challenged
and encouraged me.
1. Barack Obama, President-Elect of the United States, Statement for the
American Antitrust Institute (Sept. 27, 2007), available at
http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/archives/files/aai-
%20Presidential%20campaign%20-%200bama%209-07_092720071759.pdf.
2. Id. Capitalism and consumers reciprocally benefit each other when firms
compete with each other to offer the best prices and products to consumers. Id.
Firms that fail to create innovative or cost effective products or services will not
survive in a competitive market, and firms that respond to the needs of customers
will. Id.
3. When there is only one firm in the market, or when several competing
firms collude together to offer the same products at the same prices, the market is
not competitive. Without competition, consumers have little or no choice in the
products and services they purchase. Without alternatives to choose from,
consumers are forced to heed to the will of the dominant firm as to what products
or services the firm will supply and at what price. In this system, the dominant
firm benefits, but the consumer does not.
4. Id. When firms do not properly compete, customers can't choose from
which firms they will purchase their goods and services. Id. Firms can take
advantage of the consumer's lack of choice by raising prices, restricting supply, or
offering inferior products and services. Id.
5. Id. Antitrust is unlike government regulation; it guarantees firms benefit
from serving their customers' needs. Id. Further, it rewards firms for doing a
better job. Id. Antitrust therefore makes firms decide what best serves their
customers' needs. Id. Government regulation, on the other hand, puts that decision
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Antitrust law was developed in the United States during the late
nineteenth century to protect consumers who were made vulnerable
and exploited by monopolistic railroad companies that pushed out
competitors to fix rates and drive up rail prices on their respective
customers. 6 Congress recognized the need for further regulation and
enacted the Sherman Act (Act) in 1890 with its primary goal being to
protect the welfare of consumers.7 The Act and subsequent antitrust
laws were passed not to protect the individual competitors from each
other, but to protect competition itself.8
Despite cooperation between the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) and the Department of Justice Antitrust Division (DOJ) during
George H.W. Bush's presidency and Bill Clinton's presidency,
relations disintegrated when George W. Bush took office.' For the
into the hands of bureaucrats, CEOs, and judges. Id. Antitrust law protects
competition, fuels innovation, and fosters economic growth. Id.
6. ROBERT HIGGS, CRISIS AND LEVIATHAN: CRITICAL EPISODES IN THE
GROWTH OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, 77-82 (1987). The Post Civil War
development of the U.S. rail system was the impetus behind the first passage of
modem antitrust law with the creation of the Commerce Commission in 1887. Id.
Railroad firms ruthlessly exploited their customers in territories in which they had
monopoly power and used those profits to drive out competitors in other areas by
drastically cutting their rates. Id. The public finally had enough and lobbied
Congress to the Commerce Commission, which had the responsibility of assuring
railroad rates were reasonable and assuring there was no price discrimination based
on geography. Id.
7. ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH
ITSELF 61 (2d ed. 1993). Judge Bork was the first to coin the term "consumer
welfare," which is defined as, "all things good for consumers, such as low prices,
innovation,. and choice among differing products." Id. Judge Bork is an antitrust
expert whose opinions now dominant American legal thinking on the issue. DAVID
FRUM, How WE GOT HERE: THE '70s, at 327 (2000). After reviewing the
legislative history of antitrust law in the U.S. he asserts Congress' primary goal of
the legislation was to promote consumer welfare. BORK, supra, at 61.
8. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962). The Court in
Brown Shoe held that the goal of the Act was to protect competition, not individual
consumers. Id.
9. Mark D. Whitener, Editor's Notes: Domestic Divergence, ANTITRUST, Fall
2008, 6, 7; Obama, supra note 1. During Bush Senior's Administration and the
Clinton Administration, both agencies had differing policies on enforcement.
Whitener, ANTITRUST, at 7. But they worked together because they both
understood the importance of cooperation, which was providing corporate America
with consistent and clear guidelines of what conduct was prohibited under U.S.
Antitrust law. Id. However, the differences between the FTC and DOJ
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next eight years, antitrust enforcement was at a historic low, and
today consumers are feeling its effects.' ° Many commentators,
including President Obama, accuse the DOJ of putting the interests of
big business ahead of the interests of consumers."1 President Obama
was the first president since Franklin D. Roosevelt to voice his
concern about antitrust law on the campaign trail. Given the
importance President Obama has placed on antitrust law, this
comment will address the tenuous relationship between the FTC and
the DOJ, and the likelihood the Obama Administration will reconcile
it. This comment will first explore the development and purpose of
antitrust law in the United States. 12 Second, it will discuss why the
FTC and DOJ have a contentious and ineffective relationship. 13
Third, it will address the narrowing effect the Obama Administration
is likely to have on antitrust enforcement, despite the downturned
economy. 14  Finally, this comment will summarize what
circumstances created a climate of under-enforcement and
uncertainty, and describe the change the Obama administration will
bring to antirust law. 5
exacerbated under the last administration, and cooperation between the two
agencies significantly broke down. Dawn Goulet, Justice Department's Section 2
Report Sparks a Heated Debate in the Antitrust Community, 21 LOY. CONSUMER L.
REv. 268, 273 (2008) (citing Another Thumb on the Scales, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1,
2008, at A22).
10. Obama, supra note 1. The DOJ has failed to bring a single case against a
dominant firm for anticompetitive behavior in the past eight years, but instead
enthusiastically argues on behalf of dominant firms before the Supreme Court. Id.
Their leniency towards big business has translated into higher costs for consumers.
Id. During the last administration, there were four hundred mergers between health
care providers and, as a result, now ninety five percent of the market is controlled
by a select few firms. Id. Consequently, premiums have increased over eighty-
seven percent in the past six years. Id.
11. Id.; Neal R. Stoll & Shepard Goldfein, President Obama's Centrist
Antitrust Enforcement, 11/18/2008 N.Y.L.J. 3 (col.1), Nov. 18, 2008.
12. See infra Part II.
13. See infra Part Il.
14. See infra Part IV.
15. See infra Part V.
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II. ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPS IN THE UNITED STATES AS PRO-
CONSUMER LEGISLATION
A. Common Law Laid the Foundation of Modern Antitrust Law, but
was Ineffective in Responding to the United States' Growing Industry
Post World War I.
The Sherman Act was passed by Congress in 1890 and was a
compilation of existing common law, which banned anticompetitive
arrangements. 16  However, it went beyond common law's mere
refusal to enforce restrictive agreements, and established standards of
conduct.17 By basing the Act on common law principles, Congress
created a statute that could evolve with the practical realities of a
changing business world and societal understandings of the market
and competition. 18
The development of the rail system in the United States after the
Civil War first exposed the inadequacies of common law trade
restrictions.'9 A number of railroad firms acting together boosted
rates in areas where they shared monopoly power and used those
profits to drive out competitors in other areas by drastically cutting
rates.2' This anticompetitive behavior paired with barriers to entry,
due to requirements of huge capital investments, barred competitors
16. See WILLIAM LETWIN, LAW AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN AMERICA: THE
EVOLUTION OF THE SHERMAN ANTITRUST ACT 85-99 (1965). Supporters of the
Act believed that common law embodied a preference for competition and a
disfavor for anticompetitive tactics. Id. See also 20 Cong. Rec. 1167 (1889)
(Senator John Sherman said this statute was derived from common law restraints
on trade, which were hostile toward anticompetitive behavior.).
17. The Act needed to go beyond existing common law, which had proved to
be too simplistic. See James May, Antitrust in the Formative Era: Political and
Economic Theory in Constitutional and Antitrust Analysis, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 258,
311-31 (1989).
18. State Oil Co. v. Kahn, 522 U.S. 3, 20-21 (1997); William F. Baxter,
Separation of Powers, Prosecutorial Discretion, and the "Common Law" Nature
ofAntitrust Law, 60 TEX. L. REV. 661, 662-63 (1982).
19. Thomas A. Piraino, The Antitrust Implications of "Going Private" and
Other Changes of Corporate Control, 49 B.C. L. REV 971, 975 (2008); Bork, supra
note 7, at 19-21.
20. Id.
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from competing with established railroad companies.2 1 In response
to the railroads' trade abuses, Congress created the Interstate
Commerce Commission in 1887.22 The Commission had the
responsibility of assuring railroad rates were reasonable and assuring
there was no price discrimination based on geography. 23  The
Commission had limited success, and evidenced to government and
consumers the need for something more specific and expansive.
The limits of common law trade restrictions were further exposed
when major industries, including oil, sugar, cotton, lead, and
whiskey, began forming "trust" agreements in the 1870s to
monopolize their respective markets.24 These trusts used predatory
tactics like below cost pricing forcing competitors to sell their
businesses or be driven out of business; they defrauded investors,
indiscriminately closed down plants, and bribed public officials.
This level of greed and exploitation was unprecedented in American
history, and shocked the public and undermined their confidence in
unregulated markets.
21. Id.
22. Danya C. Wright, The Shifting Sands of Property Rights, Federal
Railroad Grants, and Economic History: Hash v. United States and the Threat to
the Rail- Trial Conversations, 38 ENVTL. L. REv. 711, 720 (2008).
23. Id.
24. See SAMUEL P. HAYS, THE RESPONSE TO INDUSTRIALISM 1885-1914, 27-
32 (Univ. of Chi. Press 2d. 1995) (1957); MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960, at 80-85 (1992). "Trusts"
enabled stockholders from several different companies to transfer their individual
securities to a common trustee, this transfer enabled each stockholder to share of
the pooled earnings of all the pooled companies. A trust is now applied to any
suspect business combinations. Id. These trade restraints constituted unreasonable
trade restraints and unlawful monopolies. Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v.
United States, 221 U.S. 1, 79 (1911).
25. Id. Predatory pricing occurs when firms defer short-term profits in order
to develop a dominant market position, which will later be used to raise prices and
recoup lost profits. Janich Bros. v. American Distilling Co., 570 F.2d 848, 856 (9th
Cir. 1977), cert denied, 439 U.S. 829 (1978).
26. Higgs, supra note 6, at 77-82. By 1888 trusts and railroads were ruthless;
they caused severe business cycles and engaged in scandalous business
transactions. Id.
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B. Congress Passes the Sherman Act to Evolve with the Changes in
Economic Thinking.
1. The Creation of the Sherman Act and the Struggle to Define its
Breadth.
Congress passed the Act in 1890 because the public needed more
protection from dominant firms controlling the markets. It was
passed with the primary intention of promoting consumer welfare by
preserving opportunities for competition, preventing unfair
redistributions of wealth, and promoting innovation.2 7 It may be the
case that the Act had other goals secondary to the promotion of
consumer welfare, which were to be evaluated and weighed
depending on the market climate at the time. While some criticize
the Act for its vague language as to what constitutes anticompetitive
conduct, the Act's generality allows courts to reinterpret it as
economic understanding of competition evolves-evidencing its goal
is in fact the protection of consumer welfare. 8
The first two sections of the Act are, by far and away, the most
frequently applied. 29 The first section addresses improper restrictive
27. Bork, supra note 7, at 61. Judge Robert Bork, "The legislative history of
the Sherman Act... displays the clear and exclusive policy intention of promoting
consumer welfare". Id. Judge Bork defines consumer welfare as the improvement
of "allocative efficiency." Id. Allocative efficiency is the market condition that
occurs when resources are allocated in a way that maximizes the net benefit
attained through their use. See Eleanor M. Fox, The Modernization of Antitrust: A
New Equilibrium, 66 CORNELL L. REv. 1140 (1981); Robert H. Lande, Wealth
Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency
Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65 (1982).
Some authorities believe the Act's creators had several conflicting goals when
they passed the Act in 1890. James May, Antitrust in the Formative Era: Political
and Economic Theory in Constitutional and Antitrust Analysis, 1880-1919, 50
OHIO ST. L.J. 257, 391-94 (1989). Professor May maintains that Congress believed
it could achieve its many goals, without compromising any of them. Id. This
makes sense, as the 51st Congress failed to indicate how courts should weigh
tradeoffs among competition goals. Id.
28. Khan, 522 U.S. at 21 (1997). In Khan, the Supreme Court emphasized the
adaptability of the Act to changed circumstances and lessons learned from
accumulated experiences. Andrew A. Gavil, After Daubert: Discerning the
Increasingly Fine Line Between the Admissibility and Sufficiency of Expert
Testimony in Antitrust Litigation, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 663, 663-711 (1997).
29. There are two main sections of the Sherman Act:
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agreements, and the second addresses the creation or misuse of
monopoly power.30 In the second section, monopolies are not illegal
per se; rather, the Act prohibits conspiracies to monopolize and
abuses of monopoly power.31 The Act does not describe in detail
what conduct it prohibited. Instead, Congress gave federal judges the
responsibility of creating the common law of federal antitrust,
consistent with the Act's general goals.32 For the first time in
American history, monopolization could be a federal crime.33
After 1890 courts wrestled over how narrowly or broadly the Act
should be applied. The Supreme Court first interpreted the Act very
narrowly when it tolerated a series of merges in United States v. E.G.
Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895). 34 In this case the defendant was an
§ 1: Every contract, combination in the form of trust or
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations, is hereby
declared to be illegal. Violators ... shall be deemed guilty of a
felony.
§ 2: Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to
monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or
persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among
the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty
of a felony.
15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1890).
30. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7. Monopoly power is not a fixed definition, but may be
inferred when a firm controls a dominant share of their respective market and
barriers to entry. Rebel Oil Co. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 51 F.3d 1421, 1434 (9th
Cir.) (1995). A barrier to entry exists when the required costs of producing,
distributing, or marketing a product is higher for those firms which seek to enter
the market as compared to those firms already established in the market. JOHN J.
MCGOWAN, Mergers for Power or Progress?, in ANTITRUST AND REGULATION:
ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF JOHN J. McGOWAN 134-35 (Franklin M. Fisher ed.)
(1985).
31. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7.
32. Id. An important section of the Act authorizes public bodies, and private
parties to enforce the statute. Id. The Act uses proscriptive language like, "thou
shall not" instead of "thou shall," making the statute very vague in terms of what is
illegal conduct. Id.
33. Id.
34. United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 41 (1895). The Court's
tolerance of this series of mergers and the executive's indifference to the Act
helped trigger a wave of mergers, such as American Tobacco, Du Pont, Eastman
Kodak, General Electric, International Harvestor, Standard Oil, United Shoe
Machinery, and U.S. Steel. William E. Kovacic & Carl Shapiro, A Century of
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American Sugar Refining Company, which controlled a large
majority of the refined sugar manufacturer market. 35 Antitrust issues
arose when the defendant purchased stock in four Philadelphia
refineries, giving the defendant control over ninety-five percent of
the country's sugar refining market. 36 The Court did not find the
defendant's action to be within the scope of the Act because the
Court reasoned the defendant was engaged in manufacturing, which
they reasoned was not a part of commerce, and thus, beyond the
Act's reach.37
Just two years after the E.C. Knight Co. decision, the Court
applied an extremely broader interpretation of the Act in United
States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Association, 166 U.S. 290 (1897). 38
The Supreme Court forbade price fixing agreements reasoning that
section 1 of the Act forbade "every agreement," regardless of its
intent or reasonableness. 39 The expansive application of the Act in
Trans-Missouri made all agreements that had the result of restraining
trade illegal, whether or not the agreement had innocent intent. The
Court softened its position the following year when it limited the Act
to prohibit only contracts whose direct and immediate effect is to
restrain trade. 40 These two cases show the Court beginning to, but
Economic and Legal Thinking, 14 J.E.P. 43, 45 (2000). The Court did not change
its position on mergers until 1904 when it forbade the combination of Northern
Pacific and Great Pacific railroads. Id.; Northern Secs. Co. v. United States, 193
U.S. 328, 360 (1904).
35. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. at 5.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 6. By distinguishing between commerce and manufacturing, the
Court found the defendant's conduct did not affect interstate commerce, and thus
did not violate the Act. Id.
38. United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Association, 166 U.S. 290 (1897).
In a 5-4 decision, the Court applied the Act to common carriers by railroad. Id. at
291. The Court held a contract restraining trade or commerce is prohibited, even
though the contract is entered into by competing railroads only for the purpose of
affecting traffic rates. Id. The Government is not obliged to show the agreement in
question had the intent to restrain trade, but simply that it had that effect. Id.
39. Id. As literal of an interpretation as this analysis is, the Court did
recognized that prohibiting all agreements which restrain trade could endanger
beneficial forms of cooperation. Kovacic & Shapiro, supra note 34, at 44.
40. Hopkins v. United States, 171 U.S. 578 (1898). Defendants were Kansas
residents and members of a voluntary unincorporated association known as the
Kansas City Live-Stock Exchange. Id. at 578. They were charged with restraining
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still struggling with, distinguishing between behavior which had the
sole purpose of restraining trade, and behavior which was intended
for legitimate business purposes.4' These cases evidence tension
arising between courts that either condemned the mere existence of
trade restrictions, courts that banned only unreasonable trade
restrictions, and those courts that focused on the intent of the
42 T eorestraint. To resolve this tension, then Sixth Circuit Judge William
H. Taft delivered the opinion in the landmark case Addyston Pipe &
Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), in 1898 and reasoned that the
primary purpose of the trade restraint would determine its legality. 43
interstate commerce by blocking the shipment of livestock to the Kansas City
market, unless it was shipped to one of the other defendants. Id. at 582. They also
compelled livestock shippers from other states to pay off the defendants, otherwise
the association's members on the receiving end would prevent their shipments from
getting to the Kansas City market. Id. at 582-83. The Court affirmed the First
Circuit Court's decision to enjoin the defendants from conspiring to combine either
by contract, conduct, or words, the conspiring of which would result in the
impeding of others to ship, trade, sell, or buy livestock from Kansas City, Missouri
and Kansas City, Kansas. Id. at 585-86. The defendants were further enjoined
from attempting to impose discriminatory fines that in any manner interfered with
the freedom of any persons trading or desiring to trade in that market. Id.
41. See John R. Carter, From Peckham to White: Economic Welfare and the
Rule of Reason, 25 ANTITRUST BULL 275-95 (1980).
42. May, supra note 27, at 391-94. By the late 19th century, courts were
unclear whether they should prohibit trade restraints that merely existed, or whether
they should evaluate them according to the reasonableness test. Id.
43. United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898). In
Addyston Pipe, six cast-iron pipe manufactures were charged with combination and
conspiracy in unlawful restraint of interstate commerce, in violation of the Sherman
Act. Id. at 272. The six manufacturers acted under an agreement where five of
them would overbid for a construction contract, thus guaranteeing the success of
the sixth manufacturer, who would bid a lower price. Id. at 292. The six
manufacturers rotated being the low bidder, and thus all benefited, and fixed the
price of cast-iron pipe in 36 different states. Id. at 292, 301.
The defendants argue that at common law their association would be valid,
and that the Sherman Act was not meant to reach any agreements valid under
common law. Id. The court distinguished between "naked" trade restraints, where
direct competitors agreed to restrict output and raise prices, and reasonable
"ancillary" restraints, which encumbered the participants only as much as needed to
expand output or to introduce a product that no single participant could offer.
Kovacic & Shapiro, supra note 34, at 45. Judge Taft concluded that if the
competitor's primary purpose was not to restrict trade, but the restriction was
merely an encumbrance on the competitor in order to expand output or introduce a
29-2
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2. The Supreme Court Takes Decisive Action in Standard Oil and
Lays the Foundation for Modem Interpretations of Antitrust Law.
The public's frustration with the Supreme Court's tolerance of
mergers reached a breaking point in 1901. President Theodore
Roosevelt shared the public's frustration and voiced it, calling the
Court more interested in protecting property rights than human
rights.44 The Court finally succumbed to this pressure in Northern
Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 328 (1904), where it
prohibited the merger of two dominant railroad companies as
unlawful restraint of trade.45  Roosevelt's popularity soared and he
earned the nickname "trust buster". He was re-elected into office
1904 promising more action like that in Northern Securities.46 Under
Roosevelt's watch, the Supreme Court broadened the interpretation
of the Act to forestall mergers and curb the creation of monopolies.
William H. Taft's administration continued to vigorously
challenge monopolies, the most stunning of which was in 1911 when
the Department of Justice sued Standard Oil Co. for violating the
Act.47 The Court held that Standard Oil Co., a major oil trust, had
product, the restraint did not violate the Sherman Act, regardless of its
reasonableness. Id. The court found it not essential that an entire monopoly be
created, but that it is sufficient to violate the Act if the agreement deprives the
public of the "advantages which flow from free competition". Addyston Pipe &
Steel, 85 F. 271 at 293. The 6th Circuit found the defendants to be in violation of
the Sherman Act by finding that their agreement had the primary purpose of
restraining the trade of cast-iron pipe, and it in fact did restrain interstate
commerce. Id. at 302.
44. Theodore Roosevelt, Colonel Roosevelt on the Big Stick and the Square
Deal, Idaho Daily Statesman, Feb. 1, 1914, at 2 (continuing his criticisms of the
judiciary even though he lost his bid for reelection).
45. Northern Secs. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 328, 360 (1904). The
Supreme Court in Northern Securities ruled in a 5-4 decision that allowing the
defendants to combine their two competition railroads into one entity would be an
unlawful restraint of trade. Id. In this decision the Court evidenced their
intolerance to mergers, narrowing the E.C. Knight decision. Kovacic & Shapiro,
supra note 34, at 45.
46. Roosevelt, supra note 44, at 2.
47. Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 81-82
(1911). Standard Oil of New Jersey and seventy other defendants were charged
with engaging in conspiracy to restrain the trade and commerce of petroleum,
refined oil, and other petroleum products, among the several States. Id. at 31.
Standard Oil of Ohio, operated by John D. Rockefeller, organized the Standard Oil
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engaged in illegal monopolization and ordered their trust be broken
up into thirty-three separate companies.48 The Court ruled the Act
should be applied if contracts are unreasonable and result in the
undue restraint of trade in interstate commerce. 49 The Court went
further than it ever had before by finding Standard Oil Co.'s ninety
percent ownership of the market evidence they were a monopoly
power and by finding below cost price fixing to be per se unlawful
trade restraints. 50
The Standard Oil decision is the regarded as the most important
antitrust case in the Act's history as it established the "rule of reason"
standard, which continues to be the basis modem of antitrust
analysis. 51 Further, Standard Oil evidenced the full force of the Act,
in that it could challenge even the most powerful business enterprises
and order their divestiture. 52  The decision also created great
ambiguity as to what constituted an unreasonable restraint of trade; a
question that continues to confuse jurists today.53
Trust in 1880. Id. at 70. They purchased interests and entered into agreements
with businesses engaged in purchasing, shipping, refining, and selling petroleum in
order to fix the price of crude and refined oil in that market. Id. at 32. The Court
found the defendants "conduct to be an unreasonable and undue restraint of trade of
petroleum, its products moved in interstate commerce, and, therefore, their actions
falls within the prohibitions of the Act". Id.
48. Id.
49. Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 3.
50. Id. at 32.
51. Kovacic & Shapiro, supra note 34, at 45. For the first time, the Supreme
Court attacked the issue of dominant firm action head on, and left four enduring
marks on antitrust law. First, the Court determined Standard's ninety percent
ownership of the oil refining market proof that it had monopoly power. Id.
Second, the Court established the rule of reason as the basic method for which
courts were to interpret antitrust cases. Id. This rule of reason remains the
foundation of antitrust analysis to this day. Third, the Court classified specific
behavior as unreasonably exclusionary. In the case of Standard Oil, the Court
determined Standard's selective below-cost price cuts and buyouts of rivals to be
unreasonably exclusionary as to maintain the firm's market dominance. Lastly, the
Court broke Standard into thirty-four parts, despite Standard's objection reasoning
it would cause it to be bankrupt. Id.
52. Id. Divestiture is a common remedy in antitrust actions, which prevents
the accumulation of monopoly power.
53. Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 86-87 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Critics argued
the Court's decision actually amended the Act by changing "every" restraint of
trade, to only "unreasonable restraints of trade." Id. Further criticism of the
29-2
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3. The Executive, the Era of Neglect, and the Collapse of 1929.
The 63rd Congress and newly elected President Woodrow Wilson
understood the importance of antitrust law, and recognized the
difficulty businesses faced when complying with a law that lacked
clarity as to what conduct was prohibited. One year into Woodrow
Wilson's presidency, he proposed the Clayton Act (Clayton) to
Congress as an expansion of the Act in order to rectify the Act's
vague language.54 Unlike the Act, Clayton prohibited four specific
anticompetitive behaviors, and declared these behaviors illegal, but
not criminal if they had the effect of lessening competition or
creating a monopoly.55 That same year, Congress created the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) and vested in it the responsibility to
prevent unfair methods of competition.56 The FTC could temporarily
decision is that if the Court is to ban only unreasonable restraints, they should also
find a way to advise firms in advance of what is considered lawful. Kovacic &
Shapiro, supra note 34, at 46.
54. See WOODROW WILSON, The New Freedom, 172 (1913). Wilson believed
the rule of reason failed to adequately guide business because it did not specify
what conduct was unlawful, and that it gave too much discretion to the courts to
distort the law. Id. Congress shared Wilson's apprehension and passed the
Clayton Act in 1914, which specifically prohibited certain anticompetitive conduct.
The 63rd Congress conceded that even with the Clayton Act, "it is impossible to
frame definitions which embrace all unfair practices. There is no limit to human
inventiveness in this [antitrust] field." H.R. Rep. No. 1142 63rd Cong. (2d Sess.
1914). Congress also created the Federal Trade Commission to create antitrust
policy and share antitrust enforcement power with the executive branch. Id.
55. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1914). The Clayton Act declared the four following
acts illegal, but not criminal: (1) price discrimination, which is selling a product at
different prices to similarly situation buyers; (2) exclusive dealing contracts, which
are sales made on the condition the buyer will not trade with the seller's
competitors; (3) corporate mergers, which are acquisitions of competition
companies; and (4) interlocking directories, which occurs when there are common
board members among competing companies. Id.
The first three acts mentioned were deemed illegal only "where the effect...
may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line
of commerce." Id. at § 13. This allowed the Clayton Act to prohibit developing
threats to competition-this nuance was broader than the Act's reach. However, the
Clayton Act was narrower, and more lenient than the Act because it no longer
made trade restraints criminal.
56. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1914). Congress created the Commission by passing the
Federal Trade Commission Act. Id. at § 5. This Act empowered the Commission
to prevent and punish unfair commercial practices and to promulgate trade
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enjoin monopolistic behavior, but it was created primarily to improve
the implementation of antitrust law.5 7 To achieve this end, Congress
staffed the FTC with economic experts and instructed them to issue
"guidelines" and give speeches to educate businesses on what
unlawful anti-competitive conduct was. 58 Together, the Act, Clayton,
and the FTC provided the essential framework of antitrust law in the
United States. Congress has refrained from defining concepts
common to the three to keep them inherently flexible. 59 As a result,
courts serve as the chief instruments in defining fundamental
concepts of antitrust such as "restraint of trade," "monopolies," and
"unfair methods of competition." 60  However, Congress did expect
courts to use common law methodology in their implementation of
antitrust law.6'
Despite the flood of new antitrust law in the early 1900s,
enforcement actually lulled between 1915 and the 1936.62 During the
regulation rules. Id. But the Act provides no criminal penalties, only equitable
relief. Id. At the urge of Wilson, the Commission encouraged fair competition by
investigating and publicizing trade abuses, and advising businesses about the
legality of their specific acts. WILSON, supra note 54, at 201-02. The Commission
would educate businesses on lawful conduct by preparing reports, giving speeches,
issuing guidelines, and negotiating settlements before going to ligation. Federal
Trade Commission, About the Federal Trade Commission,
http://www.ftc.gov/ftc/about.shtm.
Congress created the Commission with two objectives: The first was to ensure
that trade abuses would be adjudicated in the manner intended by Congress, and
not at the discretion of courts; the second objective was to improve the
implementation of antitrust policy. Id. To achieve this, the Commission had a
regular staff of multidisciplinary expertise, and its own adjudication process subject
to review by the appellate courts. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Sugar Inst. v. United States, 297 U.S. 553, 600-01 (1936). The Court
emphasized the reach of its authority in Sugar Institute when Chief Justice Hughes
said, "We have said that the Sherman Act, as a charter for freedom, has a generality
and adaptability.. . ." Id. at 600.
60. Id.
61. ERNEST GELLHORN, WILLIAM E. KOVACIC & STEPHEN CALKINS,
ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS: IN A NUTSHELL 40 (5th ed. 2004).
62. Kovacic & Shapiro, supra note 34, at 45-46. In Board of Trade of Chicago
v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238-39 (1918), the Court upheld trade restraints on
the price of after-hours commodities. The Court conceded that a multi-factored
rule of reason test might make their analysis more accurate, but rejected it as too
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"era of neglect" for antitrust law, the Executive Branch actually
discouraged both the DOJ and the FTC from aggressively
prosecuting antitrust abuses. 63  Following the direction of the
Executive, courts relied predominately on a complicated
reasonableness test in their analysis of anticompetitive behavior and
generally exonerated the arguably anticompetitive behavior of big
businesses.
64
This analysis does not overlook the Court's prohibition of certain
anticompetitive behavior as evidenced in the United States v. Trenton
Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927), decision, but characterizes its
treatment as schizophrenic. 65 Here, the Court rejected precedent that
all agreements between competitors deserve an expansive analysis.
Instead, the Court held that some unadorned agreements between
competitors to set prices were so generally pernicious that courts
could flatly prohibit them, even if an elaborate rule of reason test
might sometimes validate such arrangements. 66  The Supreme
Court's decision to flatly prohibit some price setting arrangements
without an explanation of what qualified them as "pernicious"
undoubtedly caused uneasiness in the business community. The
costly and time-consuming. Id. Instead, the Court implemented a comprehensive
inquiry into the business' history, the purpose of the restraint, and the restraint's
effect to determine if it was an unlawful restraint on trade. Id.
The following year, the Court allowed producers to unilaterally refuse to deal
with subsequent firms on the distribution chain that did not comply with the
producer's distribution policy. In 1920, the Court absolved the nation's leading
steel producers in light of outright collusion. United States v. Colgate Co., 250
U.S. 300, 307 (1919). The Court's leniency echoed through the business world that
firms could significantly consolidate before courts would find them to be illegally
monopolizing. In 1925, the Court found itself criticized again for its tolerance of
suspect anticompetitive conduct when it ruled in the defendant's favor in Maple
Flooring Manufacturers 'Ass 'n. v. United States, 268 U.S. 563, 586 (1925). In this
case the Court condoned price sharing agreements between competitors. Id.
63. Kovacic & Shapiro, supra note 34, at 46, 48. The years between 1915 and
1936 were the longest lapse of enforcement of antitrust law. Id. The courts often
treated suspect behavior permissibly, and the executive branch discouraged the
DOJ and FTC from excessively prosecuting antitrust violations. Id. at 46.
64. Id. at 45-46. The presidents during the "era of neglect" were Wilson,
Harding, Coolidge, and Hoover. The Supreme Court's decisions during this time
reflect the government's tolerant treatment of firms that colluded with each other
affecting interstate commerce. Id. at 47.
65. Id. (citing United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927)).
66. Id.; see also Bd. of Trade of Chicago, 246 U.S. at 231, 238.
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Court was generally very tolerant of anti-competitive agreements, but
could condemn certain behavior without a set method of analysis or a
set hierarchy of goals-a decision based on utter discretion.
Even after the economic collapse of the U.S. economy in 1929,
our government remained reluctant to renew zealous antitrust
enforcement or re-invigorate its emphasis on beneficial
competition.67 A stunning example of that reluctance occurred in the
early 1930s during the depths of the Great Depression, in
Appalachian Coals v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933), which later
became known as a "depression-era aberration." 68 In Appalachian
Coals, several coal competitors together controlled over seventy-five
percent of the U.S. coal market and colluded together to fix the price
of coal and restrict its output.69 The Court dismissed the question of
whether this trade restraint eliminated competition between the said
competitors. Instead, the Court focused on the nature and the effect
of the restraint at issue. 70 It is counterintuitive that, even in the midst
of a depression, the Court would allow conspiring firms to exploit
consumers by boosting prices and controlling output in the coal
market.7' On the heels of this decision and in a hope to rectify its
ills, many business leaders, economists, and government officials
67. Kovacic & Shapiro, supra note 34, at 46-47. President Hoover was the
first President to urge businesses to cooperate and exchange information with each
other and the government through trade associations in order to do away with the
wastefulness of competition. Ellis W. Hawley, Herbert Hoover, the Commerce
Secretariat, and the Vision of an "Associative State" 61 J. AMER. HIST. 116-40
(1974), available at
http://www.history.ucsb.edu/faculty/fumer/l 66A/downloads/Hawl-Ber.pdf.
Hoover and other "associationalists" believed that the corroboration between
businesses and the government that took place during World War I would best
serve consumers in a competitive economy and should be continued in times of
peace. Id.
68. Kovacic & Shapiro, supra note 34, at 48; Appalachian Coal, Inc. v. United
States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933).
69. Id. Because the colluding firms were all located on the east coast of the
United States, they actually enjoyed a greater monopoly power in their territory
than a seventy-five continental market share would imply. Id. The defendants
made the unsuccessful argument that the collusion was necessary in order to
survive hard economic times. Id.
70. Appalachian Coal, Inc., 288 U.S. at 377.
71. This decision can be interpreted as the government's waning faith in the
free market system. Kovacic & Shapiro, supra note 34, at 48.
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became advocates of close coordination between businesses and
government in the 1930s, and ushered in a new generation of antitrust
enforcement involving cooperation and oversight.7 2
4. A Short Analysis from the Mid-1930's Through Modem Antitrust
Law.
By the late 1930s, the hope inspired by the New Deal had waned.
Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR) looked to his advisors, who believed
that competition was the key to economic restoration, for help to
restore the economy.73 FDR's trust-busting revival began with his
pressure on the Justice Department to make ambitious attacks on
horizontal collusion and single-firm dominance. 74  The renewed
antitrust enforcement in the late 1930s reflected both a heightened
suspicion of big business and a search for ways to simplify the
government's burden of proof in antitrust cases. 75 The Court made
several rulings in the following decades demonstrating this goal.76
72. Id. at 47. In response to the devastation of the economic collapse, the
government bolstered its power over businesses and urged cooperation between the
two. Id. The government expanded its power over business when it designed the
National Industrial Recovery Act and the Early New Deal. Id. In the mid-1930s,
Congress attempted to regulate the transportation industry by passing
comprehensive controls on entry and pricing. Id. Congress also passed the
Robinson-Patman Act of 1936, which prohibited the expansion of a retail store if it
was at the expense of another. Id.
73. Id. at 49.
74. Kovacic & Shapiro, supra note 34, at 48. University of Chicago
economists like Henry Simons, Jacob Viner, and Frank Knight joined Roosevelt's
cause of robust antitrust enforcement, including steps to decentralize American
industry. Id. Horizontal collusion is collusion among competitors or distributors at
the same level of production or distribution to fix prices or control the supply of the
goods and services they produce. Single-firm dominance refers to the situation
where a monopoly or quasi-monopoly has such economic strength in the industry
as to have the ability to prevent effective competition.
75. Id. at 49.
76. Id. at 50. In United States v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150
(1940), and Interstate Circuit Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939), the Court
ruled unlawful agreements could be proven without direct evidence such as a
participant's testimony. Id. (citing United States v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 310
U.S. 150 (1940); and Interstate Circuit Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939)).
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As courts tightened rules for collusion and cooperation, they grew
more willing to find dominant firms acted improperly.77
By the 1960s, corporate America realized that antitrust law
enforcement had dramatically changed from the permissiveness of
the 1920s and the early 1930s.78 By the 1970s, lead authorities like
Robert Bork and Rickard Posner were questioning the per se
illegality rules.79  These commentators argued that contrary to
popular belief, some conduct, like vertical restraints, was often
benign or even pro-competitive.80 By the mid 1970s, courts began to
follow the lead of forward thinkers like Bork and Posner.8 Most of
the Supreme Court decisions from the 1940s through the late 1980s
demonstrate a middle-of-the-road interpretation between per se
condemnation and an elaborate rule of reason test.82 During the
1970s and 1990s, despite the large number of cases brought by the
FTC and the DOJ, the courts gave dominant firms significant
freedom to choose pricing, product development, and promotional
strategies.
83
77. Kovacic & Shapiro, supra note 34, at 50.
78. Id. at 51.
79. Id. at 53. Attorneys like Bork, Posner, Frank Easterbrook, and Ernest
Gellhom questioned many of the per se illegal rules courts imposed between 1940
and 1972. Id. Around 1972, these authorities became advocates of some pro-
competitive conduct that may not have originally survived the per se illegality
analysis. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 50. Courts became increasingly sensitive to efficiency arguments
for two reasons in the mid 1970s. Id. First, President Nixon's appointments to the
Supreme Court, most notably, Lewis Powel. Id. The second factor in their
narrowed preference for antitrust enforcement was the sense that U.S. firms were
losing domestic market share to foreign firms. Id. The Supreme Court's decision
in Continental T.V. Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977), evidenced the
Courts willingness to use economic analysis of the effects of anticompetitive
conduct in applying the rule of reason test. Id. (citing Continental T.V. Inc. v. GTE
Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977)).
82. Id. at 54. The best example of the Court's reconciliation between per se
illegality and a complicated rule of reason test are in Federal Trade Commission v.
Indiana Federation of Dentists. Kovacic & Shapiro, supra note 34, at 50 (citing
Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986)).
83. The Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice are the two
federal agencies charged with enforcing U.S. antitrust laws. With the exception of
United States v. AT&T Co., 553 F. Supp. 131 (D.C. Cir. 1982), neither
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C. What is the Goal of the Sherman Act, are There Multiple Goals?
Judge Robert Bork opined that the goal of antitrust law must be
understood before the judiciary can decide antitrust issues.8 4 After
investigating the Act's legislative history and other antitrust statutes,
Bork concluded the overriding goal of antitrust law is to increase
consumer welfare. 85  Critics argue that Bork's "original
interpretation" neglects the possibility that Congress had more than
merely one goal, but acted for a "powerful, widely shared vision of a
natural, rights-based political and economic order that simultaneously
tended to ensure opportunity, efficiency, prosperity, justice, harmony,
and freedom." 86 Modern Supreme Court decisions evidence multiple
views concerning the proper goal of antitrust law.
In 1962, the Supreme Court adopted Bork's "original
interpretation" view in its decision in Brown Shoe Co. v. United
States.8' The Court determined Congress meant to protect
enforcement agency had much success overcoming the courts' presumption for
favoring dominant firms. Id. (citing United States v. AT&T Co., 553 F. Supp. 131
(D.C. Cir. 1982); Maryland v. United States, 260 U.S. 1001 (1983)). 1974 marked
the government's first Supreme Court defeat for a case brought under the Celler-
Kefauver Act. This act closed a loophole left by the Clayton Act. Id. (citing United
States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974)). During this time, it was
clear courts were trimming back antitrust doctrine. Id.
84. ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH
ITSELF 50 (2d ed. 1993).
Judge Robert Bork explained,
Antitrust policy cannot be made rational until we are able to
give a firm answer to one question: What is the point of the law
- what are its goals? Everything else follows from the answer we
give. Is the antirust judge to be guided by one value or by
several? If by several, how is he to decide cases where a conflict
in values arises? Only when the issue of goals has been settled is
it possible to frame a coherent body of substantive rules.
Id.
85. Id.
86. James May, Antitrust in the Formative Era: Political and Economic
Theory in Constitutional and Antitrust Analysis, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 258, 391 (1989).
Despite Judge Bork's questionable statement of the Act's original intent, his
opinion's apparent simplicity in application does attract federal judges as it leaves
them with a reliable method for ranking the statute's goals, and a system of how to
resolve conflicts among them. Id.
87. Brown Shoe Co., 370 U.S. at 320.
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competition, not competitors, and it intended to restrain mergers only
to the extent they lessened competition. 88 Fifteen years later, Justice
Marshall quoted this reasoning in his unanimous opinion in
Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488
(1977).89 Despite the reference, the Court in Brunswick embraced an
efficiency orientation, and departed from the Court's former opinion
that Congress' intent was to protect competition by protecting small
competitors' right to compete.
90
After World War II and when American firms were dominant,
decisions like Brown Shoe emphasized non-efficiency goals-like the
protection of small competitors. 91 With the introduction of Japanese
and Western European industry to the American economy in the
1970s, the judiciary was forced to re-examine its antitrust policy if it
was going to protect the competitive position of American firms.
92
Justice Black's justification for antitrust laws in Northern Pacific
Railway Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958), continues to
resonate today. He reasoned antitrust laws were:
88. Id.
89. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488 (1977)
(quoting Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 320). Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat brought this action
against Brunswick Corporation claiming that Brunswick's acquisitions of several
competing bowling centers might substantially lessen competition or tend to create
a monopoly in violation of section 7 of the Clayton Act. Id. Justice Warren
delivered the Court's opinion and ruled that the respondent must show they
sustained an injury that was a result of the petitioner's anticompetitive conduct. Id.
at 487-88. The majority reasoned,
If the acquisitions here were unlawful it, is because they
brought a "deep pocket" parent into a market of "pygmies."
Yet[,] respondents' injury[,] the loss of income that would have
accrued had the acquired centers gone bankrupt[,] bears no
relationship to the size of either the acquiring company or its
competitors. Respondents would have suffered the identical
"loss" but no compensable injury had the acquired centers
instead obtained refinancing or been purchased by "shallow
pocket" parents ...
Id. at 487.
90. Id. at 487-88.
91. See PHILLIP AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW AND INDUSTRIAL POLICY, IN
ANTITRUST, INNOVATION, AND COMPETIVENESS 34-35 (Thomas J. Teece ed. 1992).
92. GELLHORN ET AL., supra note 61, at 48.
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designed to be a comprehensive charter of economic
liberty aimed at preserving free and unfettered
competition as the rule of trade. [They] rest[] on the
premise that the unrestrained interaction of
competitive forces will yield the best allocation of our
economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest
quality and the greatest material progress, while at the
same time providing an environment conducive to the
preservation of our democratic political and social
institutions. ' 9
3
It looks like both Justice Black and Bork's original interpretation
have won the day, as the DOJ and the FTC assert, antitrust law in
America has the primary goal of protecting consumer welfare by
protecting competition. 94 They reason that free and open competition
ensures lower prices, innovation, and more efficient methods of
operation; the end result of which is lower prices and higher quality
goods and services for consumers.
95
III. THE TENUOUS RELATIONSHIP DEVELOPS BETWEEN THE FEDERAL
TRADE COMMISSION AND THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE OVER
CONFLICTING ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT POLICIES.
The DOJ and the FTC are the two agencies responsible for
enforcing U.S. antitrust offenses. 96 The DOJ was charged with
93. Northern. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
94. United States Department of Justice, Antitrust Enforcement and the
Consumer, http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/div-stats/211491.htm; Timothy J.
Muris, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm'n, ABA Antitrust Section, Antitrust
Enforcement at the Federal Trade Commission: In a Word-Continuity (Aug. 07,
2001), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/muris/murisaba.shtm.
95. U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Enforcement and the Consumer,
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/divstats/211491 .htm. In freely competitive
markets, competitors try to attract customers by lowering their prices, and
increasing the quality of their goods or services. Id. Profit motivations, thus,
ensure customers' best interests will be served. Id. Customers lose out on the
benefits of competition when competitors agree to fix prices, agree to divide up
business, or agree to restrict supply of a particular good or service. Id. Antitrust
law prohibits those agreements that threaten to raise prices for consumers or
deprive them of new and better goods and services. Id.
96. Robert W. Crandall & Clifford Winston, Does Antitrust Policy Improve
Consumer Welfare? Assessing the Evidence 17 J.E.P. 3, 4 n.4 (2003).
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enforcing Sections 1 and 2 of the Act in 1890.9 7 It is responsible for
determining whether a business' conduct is so inherently dangerous
that the conduct warrants criminal prosecution.98 Both the DOJ and
the FTC are responsible for enforcing Section 7 of Clayton, which
prohibits firms from merging with each other where such a merger
could threaten to substantially reduce competition in interstate
commerce. 99  Clayton also prohibits "tying" arrangements and
prohibits competitors from having the same directors on their
respective boards. 100 Further, the FTC has the unique authority to
sue firms for "unfair methods of competition" under Section 5 of the
FTC (Section 5). This provides an important check on the DOJ's
discretion, and usually takes the form of issuing guidelines of proper
competitive conduct and giving speeches to educate businesses on
what is lawful competitive behavior.' 0'
The differences between the FTC and DOJ are important, not
only because they provide an important check on each other, but also
because together they create an all-encompassing forum for the
enforcement of antitrust law.'0 2 There are at least four assumptions
underlying the DOJ's enforcement of antirust that the FTC disagrees
with: (1) the DOJ believes that monopoly profits encourage firms to
innovate and compete; (2) the risk of over-enforcement is greater
than the risk of under-enforcement; (3) the costs of administration are
97. Id. Section 1 of the Act prohibits contracts, combinations, and
conspiracies that restrain trade. Id. Section 2 of the Act prohibits attempts to
monopolize a business' respective market. Id.
98. Id. The DOJ may have felt pressure to obtain criminal convictions and, to
that end, made some questionable decisions about what it identified as pernicious
behavior. Id. at 43. Critics charge the Department with failing to provide business
managers with fair notice of what acts would be treated as criminal. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. "Tying" or "bundling" occurs when firms force consumers to buy a
second product by packaging it with the product the consumer wants to buy. Id.
For example, if with the purchase of a razor, the consumer had to also purchase
razor blades because the razor blade producer had packaged them together or
manufactured the razor to only work with the producer's blade. Id.
101. Id. For example, the FTC first investigated a claim against Microsoft for
bundling its software products under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission
Act. Id. Pressured by the FTC, the DOJ subsequently filed a Section 2 case
against Microsoft.
102. Roundtable Discussion Advise for the New Administration, ANTITRUST,
Summer 2008, at 8, 9.
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a factor that should be weighed against enforcement of Section 2
violations; and (4) there is a need for clear and administrable tests,
and the court has recognized this need and fashioned bright line tests
as a result.10 3
The delicate balance between the two agencies' roles and scope
of authority is important; for when this balance is disrupted,
problems ensue. 10 4 Historically, it has been the case that the DOJ
challenged more cases than the FTC because the DOJ was initially
set up as the more aggressive agency, as it had the authority to
enforce stricter penalties for abuses of the set antitrust law. 05 When
the DOJ's challenge rate is significantly lower than that of the FTC,
it can be argued that enforcement has been curtailed.
A. The Tension Begins: The Debate Over what the FTC's Scope of
Enforcement Ought to be, and the Development of their Authority to
Enforce.
Congress created the FTC in 1914 to be an administrative agency
with antitrust expertise.'06 At its inception, the agency was intended
to have the structure and flexibility to identify, analyze, and
challenge new forms of unfair methods of competition as they
developed. 10 7  This implies that the FTC had the authority to
103. Goulet, supra note 9, at 270-72 (citing Statement of Commissioners
Harbour, Leibowitz, and Roesch on the Issuance of the Section 2 Report by the
Department of Justice (Sept. 8, 2008), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2008/O9/080908section2stmt.pdf).
104. Roundtable Discussion Advise for the New Administration, supra note
102, at 9.
105. Id.
106. Andy J. Miller, A Procedural Approach to "Unfair Methods of
Competition " 93 IOWA L. Rev. 1485, 1496 (2008).
107. Id. (quoting J. Thomas Rosch, Comm'r Fed. Trade Comm'n, Address
Before the National Economic Research Associates 2006 Antitrust and Trade
Regulation Seminar 7: Perspectives on Three Recent Votes: The Closing of the
Adelphia Communications Investigation, the Issuance of the Valassis Complaint &
the Weyerhauser Amicus Breif, (July 6, 2006), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/rosch/Rosch-NERA-Speech-July6-2006.pdf).
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condemn behavior it believed to be anticompetitive, even if that
behavior did not technically violate existing antitrust law. 0 8
There are several advantages of the FTC's implementation
strategy over that of the DOJ's. i0 9 Unlike the DOJ's stiff penalties
for antitrust violations, like treble damages, attorney's fees, and even
criminal liability, the FTC typically enforces antitrust law through
consent decrees, cease-and-desist orders, and formal proceedings. 110
A significant advantage of the FTC's enforcement strategy is that it is
relatively inexpensive, which benefits not only defendants, but, more
importantly, consumers as well.11'
Congress delegated the authority to condemn "unfair methods of
competition" to the FTC, however, it was not immediately clear what
that meant.' 12 Debate ensued whether or not that meant the FTC
could affirmatively enforce the law where the DOJ could not." i3
Courts in the 1920s interpreted the FTC's power narrowly. A
prominent example of this was in Federal Trade Commission v.
Eastman Kodac Co., 274 U.S. 619 (1927).114 In Kodac, the Supreme
108. Id. at 1496-97. Broadly interpreting Section 5 makes sense. If it were
meant to cover the same territory as the Act, then Congress could have written it in
the statute accordingly. Id. (citing In re. Rambus, Inc., 2006 WL 2330118 (quoting
51 Cong. Rec. 12,151 or 12,154 or 12,454, 12,613 (statement of Sen. Cummins')).
109. Just as the overriding goal of antitrust law is to promote consumer
welfare, the enforcement should also be for the consumer welfare.
110. Miller, supra note 106, at 1494-95.
111. Id. Businesses, many times, do not incur the majority of the harm
resulting from litigation; instead, the consumer does because the business is likely
to pass on the cost of the litigation to the consumer by raising the price of the
products or services of the business. Another advantage of FTC enforcement when
compared with DOJ enforcement is that the FTC's actions do not implicate non-
mutual collateral estoppel.
112. Id. The FTC has the authority to prohibit "unfair methods of
competition" as proscribed by Section 5 of the FTC Act. Whitener, ANTITRUST, at
6. This act functions as a catch-all provision that would otherwise not fall under
any other antitrust laws, such as invitations to collude. Id.
113. Id. Several Supreme Court decisions since the 1920s have answered
whether or not that meant the FTC could affirmatively enforce the law where the
DOJ could not in the affirmative. Id.
114. Kovacic & Shapiro, supra note 34, at 48. But in the 1920s, before that
final affirmation, the FTC hardly made any contribution to antitrust enforcement.
Id. During the 1920s, the FTC was subject to continuing dismissals of their cases
and the "bumptious leadership" of Louis Brandeis. Id. The chief author of the
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Court ruled the FTC lacked the power under Section 5 to order
divesture of firms whose merger produced anticompetitive effects on
interstate commerce.' 15  This ruling thwarted the FTC's early
development; the agency did not regain the authority to enforce
Section 5 offenses for another fifty years." 6 In the Court's landmark
decision of Federal Trade Commission v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co.,
405 U.S. 223 (1972), in 1972, the Court found the FTC did not have
to find the conduct in question to have violated the letter or spirit of
the antitrust laws, but that competition could be unfair under Section
5 independently. 117  Reinvigorated, the FTC used their newfound
authority to implement over two-dozen industry wide rules between
1971 and 1980.118
Federal Trade Commission Act called the agency's early commissioners "a stupid
administration". Id. (quoting AUTHOR S. LINK, WOODROW WILSON AND THE
PROGRESSIVE ERA 1910-1917 (Harper Torchbook ed. 1963) (1954)).
115. Id.; Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Eastman Kodac Co., 274 U.S. 619 (1927).
Had the Court found in favor of the FTC, it may have become the government's
predominant enforcement agency for mergers. Kovacic & Shapiro, supra note 34,
at 48-49.
116. FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 239 (1972). The Court
in Sperry explicitly held that Section 5 authorized the, "FTC to define and
proscribe an unfair competitive practice, even though the practice does not infringe
either the letter or the spirit of the antitrust laws... [and] ... to proscribe practices
as unfair or deceptive in their effect upon consumers regardless of their nature or
quality as competitive practices or their effect on competition." Miller, supra note
106, at 1499 (quoting Sperry at 239).
117. Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act: The Most Powerful
Weapon Against Competitive Threats Before the H. Comm. on Small Business
110th Cong. 2 (statement of William C. MacLeod) (citing Fed. Trade Comm n v.
Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 223 (1972)). In this case, the Court agreed that
"fairness" depended on the following factors:
(1) "Whether the practice, without necessarily having been
previously considered unlawful, offends public policy as it has
been established by statutes, the common law . . . or other
established concepts of unfairness;" (2) "whether it is immoral,
unethical, or oppressive, or unscrupulous;" and (3) "whether it
causes substantial injury to consumers (or competitors or other
businessmen)."
Id. at 2-3 (quoting Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. at 244).
118. Id. at 3. Building on this energy, the FTC passed over two dozen
industry-wide rules between 1971 and 1980. Id. These rules included prohibiting
business from hiring illegal aliens, preventing companies from cheating on their
taxes, requiring companies with repeated environmental violations to put an
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In the years following, appellate courts attempted to limit the
Sperry holding. Despite these attempts, the Supreme Court
reaffirmed its stance on the issue in 1986 in Federal Trade
Commission v. Indiana Federation of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447
(1986),119 There, the Court reconfirmed its position, ruling the FTC
had the authority under Section 5 to condemn anticompetitive
practices other than those covered by antitrust laws. 120 The debate
over Section 5 rests in the light of the last seventy years of unbroken
Supreme Court decisions interpreting Section 5 as possessing a wider
range of behavior than that covered by existing antitrust laws.' 2'
environmentalist on their board of directors, and even prohibiting companies from
advertising to children. Id. Some initial supporters of the FTC's criticized its
increased breadth was actually making it harder for small businesses to compete,
and harder for consumers to get what they wanted. Id. This period can be
characterized as the agency trying to find its proper place in antitrust law.
119. Id. at 3-4. Appellate courts were skeptical of the FTC's authority after
Sperry and in their own courts tried to limit the FTC's exercise of authority over
matters outside the well-settled limits of antitrust law. Id. One court of appeals
held that parallel pricing did not arise to an illegal conspiracy under the Act. Id.
(citing El du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 729 F.2d 128 (2d Cir.
1984)). Another court of appeals overturned the FTC's condemnation of a
company who refused to deal with retailers who did not follow the distributors
suggested retail price levels. Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act,
supra note 117, at 3-4 (citing Russel Stover Candies v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 718
F.2d 256 (8th Cir. 1983)). Another significant attempt to check the FTC's exercise
of power occurred when one appellate court held the FTC did not have the power
to regulate the affairs of dominant firms that had committed no per se illegal acts to
achieve their respective positions. Id. at 4 (citing Official Airline Guides, Inc. v.
Fed. Trade Comm'n, 630 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1980)).
In FTC v. Indiana Federation of Dentists, the Court made a determinative step
to construe the bonds of "unfairness" and the FTC's authority to enforce Section 5
violations. Id.
The Supreme Court... found that the standard for "unfairness" under
the FTC Act is "by necessity, an elusive one, encompassing not only
practices that violate the Sherman Act and the other antirust laws, but also
practices that the Commission determines are against public policy for
other reasons."
Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 454 (1986); see also
Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. at 242 (holding FTC has authority to constrain,
among other things "deception, bad faith, fraud, or oppression"); Kovacic &
Shapiro, supra note 34, at 48.
120. Id.
121. Miller, supra note 106 at 1499 (citing In re.Rambus, Inc., 2006 WL
2330118 (holding, "Each of these [appellate-court] cases was decided before
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While the Court in Sperry held the FTC's authority broad enough to
handle any threat to a business' freedom to compete, the real
challenge for the FTC is to use that authority wisely.' 22
The 1990s were marked with unprecedented inter-agency
cooperation between the DOJ and the FTC. 123 Even though the two
agencies had distinct theories on enforcement, both agencies
recognized the importance of consensus.' 24  The most striking
difference between the agencies' policies perhaps is the DOJ's
disapproval for buyer-up-front consent orders and the FTC's
rejection of fix-it-first proposals.' 25  Authorities characterized the
[Indiana Federation of Dentists], with its reliance on Sperry & Hutchinson's
reiteration of Section 5's breadth.").
122. Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, supra note 117, at 4.
123. Whitener, ANTITRUST, at 7. During the administrations of Bush Senior
and Clinton, Inter-agency cooperation came in the form of first issuing joint federal
guidelines for merger enforcement, intellectual property, health care, international
operations and competitions. Id.
124. Id.
125. Logan M. Breed & David J. Michnal, Merger Remedies: The DOJ's New
Guide to Old Differences with the FTC, ANTITRUST, Spring 2005, 37 1, 7. A
buyer-up-front requirement is one in which the FTC compels the buyer of the asset
to be identified and signed before the deal will be approved. Id. With this remedy,
the FTC seeks to reduce the risk an adequate buyer will not be found, the
consequence of which would be the failure of the deal. Id. Fix-it-first remedies are
structural remedies the parties themselves implement before the merger is
completed. Id. The DOJ expressly states that merging parties can avoid a second
request, if they use fix-it-first remedies. Id. A second request is a discovery
procedure used by the DOJ and FTC to acquire more information about the
potential merging companies. Robert S. Schlossberg & Robert B. Wiggins, The
Devil is in the Details: Second Request Compliance, ANTITRUST, SUMMER 1998, 6.
To emphasize the impact of fix-it-first as a remedy, between June 2001 and July
2003, twelve out of the thirteen merger challenges brought by the DOJ were
resolved through fix-it-first divestitures. Breed and Michnal, ANTITRUST, at 3.
The DOJ supports fix-it-first divestiture because it avoids potentially lengthy
and complicated negotiations through consent decrees. Id. The DOJ continues that
it enables parties to alter their merger deal in a way that resolves the agency's
competitive concerns. Id. Commentators argue that one reason the DOJ allows fit-
it-first remedies may be because under the Tunney Act the DOJ is subjected to
review by a federal court in relation to the decisions on mergers and acquisitions.
Id. Fix-it-first remedial measures enable the DOJ to navigate itself around the
requirements of the Tunney Act and avoid potential judicial review. Id. The
Microsoft decision is a prime example of how the DOJ avoided judicial review and
public scrutiny. Id.
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1990s as a time where both agencies were searching for a sensible
middle ground. 126 During this time, antitrust was taken seriously and
cases were brought, but not by indefensible initiatives. 127
B. Tension Between the FTC and the DOJ Mounts Under the Bush
Administration.
There is little debate that enforcement of antitrust abuses in the
past two presidential terms was the weakest in the last half-
century. 2  Under the Clinton Administration, the FTC and DOJ
jointly brought on average more than seventy claims per year against
firms whose mergers would likely harm consumer welfare.1 29 This
number was cut in half during the Bush Administration, which, on
average, challenged only thirty-three merger cases per year. 130
Instead, the DOJ under the Bush Administration focused a
In contrast, the FTC stated that it disapproves of fix-it-first remedial measures,
and much prefers binding consent orders. Logan, ANTITRUST, at 3. Commentators
argue that this disapproval might stem from the fact that the FTC is a decentralized
and independent agency and the negotiation element of fix-it-first procedures might
not be conducive to the FTC's structure. Id. Unlike the DOJ, the FTC is a
proponent of buyer up front consent decrees. Id. at 4. These decrees by the FTC
require the merging parties to identify the buyer of any divested assets in advance
of the merger. Id. The FTC supports its position indicating that if the buyer is
identified in advance, the risk that the parties won't be able to find a buyer capable
of maintain or restoring competition, thus mitigating the possibility of asset
deterioration upon divestiture. Id. Experts surmise a more appropriate difference
for these differences is due to the structural and procedural differences between the
agencies, one being an independent commission and the other an executive agency.
Id. at 7.
126. Roundtable Discussion Advise for the New Administration, supra note
102, at 3. Robert Pitofsky of Georgetown University Law Center, stated his
opinion of antitrust in the 1990s as a balanced agenda in a discussion with other
antitrust experts. Id. His statement about the 1900s was made in reaction to the
over-enforcement of the Warren Court. Id.
127. Id. Authorities mark antitrust enforcement in the 1990s as a balanced
antitrust agenda, where energy was expensed, and antitrust was taken seriously. Id.
128. Obama, supra note 1.
129. Id.
130. Id.; Hogan & Hartson, Antitrust Update: Antitrust Enforcement in the
Obama Administration, Dec. 2008, at 1 (Dec. 2008). The DOJ contends this
statistic reflects the agency's focus on over-deterrence. Id.
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predominant amount of energy on cartel-oriented investigations. 13 1
Even more alarming are the statistics showing the DOJ has failed to
bring a single case against a dominant firm for anticompetitive
behavior in the past eight years, but, instead, enthusiastically argues
on behalf of dominant firms before the Supreme Court. 132
The dangers of under enforcement are readily evident in the
health care industry. 33 In the past ten years, there have been over
four hundred mergers between health care providers, resulting in
ninety-five percent of the market under control of a select few
firms.'13  The cost of collusion to consumers has been premium
increases of over eighty-seven percent in the past six years, and an
increase in the number of uninsured Americans to forty-seven
million, or one in seven.' 35 This burden on consumers leaves many
frustrated and critical of the DOJ's tolerance of big business
dominating the heath care market. 36  The FTC has urged that it
would save consumers and the federal government billions of dollars
annually if pharmaceutical companies were enjoined from colluding
with their competitors to keep low-cost generic drugs off the
market. 137
With the exception of cartel enforcement, the DOJ has vastly
under prosecuted antitrust claims during the Bush Administration.
138
131. Steven T. Taylor, Antitrust Groups Get Ready and Get Set to go as
Enforcement Efforts Ramp Up, 28 No. 2 OF COUN 1, Feb. 2009 1-2.
132. Obama, supra note 1; Goulet, supra note 9, at 273 (citing Another Thumb
on the Scales, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2008, at A22).
133. Letter from the American Hospital Assoc. to Christine Vamey, Chief of
the Department of Justice Antitrust Division, (May 11, 2009),
http://www.aha.org/aha/letter/2009/09-50- 11 -1tr-pollack-varney.pdf.
134. Id.
135. Id.; Letter from the Heath Care for America Now to Christine Varney,
Chief, Department of Justice Antitrust Division (May 19, 2009),
http://hcfan.3cdn.net/60de4bc8c6929815dcurm6bhu9z.pdf.
136. Id.
137. Joe Leibowitz, Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission, "Pay-for-
Delay" Settlements in the Pharmaceutical Industry: How Congress can Stop
Anticompetitive Conduct, Protect Consumers' Wallets, and Help Pay for
Healthcare Reform (The $35 Billion Solution) (Jun. 23 2009), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/leibowitz/090623payfordelayspeech.pdf.
138. Roundtable Discussion Advise for the New Administration, supra note
102, at 3. Robert Pitofsky asserts that the DOJ's cartel enforcement program, and
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Critics agree the DOJ's laissez-faire enforcement puts the interests of
big business ahead of the interests of consumers.13 9 Many assert the
DOJ has been too lenient towards mergers that have the potential to
harm consumer welfare. 140 One very controversial decision occurred
in 2006 when the DOJ approved the merger of Whirlpool and
Maytag, which had the effect of increasing Whirlpool-Maytag market
concentration by seventy-five percent.141
The DOJ's "hands-off stance" has been criticized as
"conspicuous and troubling."'142 Senator Kohl, chairman of the
Senate Judiciary Committee's antitrust subcommittee further
admonished the DOJ's Maytag decision calling it "an assault on the
Sherman Act," and that it represents just "another anti-competition
and anti-consumer decision by the Antitrust Division."'' 43 Assistant
notably their leniency program, is a booming success. Id. He cites, as support for
his assertion, the fact that fines and jail time have increased. Id. Cartels are so
profitable, Pitofsky argues, that adequate deterrence requires very expensive fines
and the possibility of real jail time. Id.
139. Stoll & Goldfein, supra note 11 (characterizing the DOJ's enforcement
policy regarding mergers and dominant firm conduct as laissez-faire); Goulet,
supra note 9, at 272-73; There is wide spread criticism that the DOJ places the
interests of firms that enjoy monopoly to near monopoly power ahead of the
interests of consumers and the DOJ released their report, Competition and
Monopoly: Single-Firm Conduct Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, in September
2008. Id. A New York Times editorial recently called the report "a deregulatory
gift aimed at getting pesky antitrust enforcers off the back of big business." Id.
(quoting Another Thumb on the Scales, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2008, at A22). The
author of this article criticizes the standard of review suggested by the DOJ who
asserts that anticompetitive harm is "disproportionately" greater to the
precompetitive conduct as it "bends over backward to protect big firms." Id.
140. Diana Moss, Whirlpool, Maytag, the DOJ, and Transparency, AMERICAN
ANTITRUST INSTITUTE, April 24, 2006, available at
http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/Archives/499.ashx.
141. Id.
142. Goulet, supra note 9, at 273 (quoting Jonathan B. Baker, Turning on
Itself How Dueling Agencies in the Bush Administration Made Mincemeat of
Antitrust Regulation Policy, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 15, 2008, at 1). Baker calls
the DOJ's decision not to challenge the Whirlpool-Maytag merger conspicuous and
troubling. Id.
143. Id. (quoting Peter Whoriskey, Justice's Monopoly Guidelines Assailed,
WASH. POST, Sept. 9, 2008, at DOI). Senator Herb Kohl, a democrat from
Wisconsin and the chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee's antitrust
subcommittee, berated the DOJ's recent decision to not challenge the potential
merger between washing machine giants Whirlpool and Maytag. Id.
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Attorney General Thomas 0. Barnett defends the Whirlpool-Maytag
merger, arguing it results in greater economies of scale, which the
U.S. market requires if it is going to compete with foreign
competitors. 44
Experts argue that the combined market power of Whirlpool and
Maytag would impair the ability of rivals to compete with the new
washing machine giant and, consequentially, substantially lessen
competition. 145 They further caution that consumers will be harmed
by higher prices, fewer alternatives, and reduced innovation. 46 In
2007, the DOJ sparked controversy again when it approved of the
merger between satellite radio industry leaders XM Radio and Sirius
Satellite Radio.147 The DOJ instigated another heated debate when it
moved to have their consent decree on Microsoft lifted, which is seen
by most as a major victory for antitrust and consumer welfare.148
FTC Chairman William Kovacic described the relationship
between the FTC and the DOJ as "an archipelago of policy makers
with [a] very inadequate ferry service between the islands," he noted
that in "too many instances when you go visit those islands the
inhabitants come out with sticks and torches and try to chase you
144. Diana B. Henriques, U.S. Antitrust Review Backs Whirlpool-Maytag
Merger, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2006. Cutting at Barnett's support for the merger,
Henriques asserts there are no foreign washing machine companies able to compete
with either Maytag or Whirlpool.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Hogan & Hartson, supra note 130, at 1.
148. Id.; Goulet, supra note 9, at 273 (quoting Baker, supra note 142).
Jonathan Baker calls the DOJ's permissive settlement of the monopolization case
against Microsoft as conspicuous and troubling. Id. In 2001, the DOJ announced
that it would no longer seek a break up of Microsoft, and agreed to commence
negotiations to settle the lawsuit. United States v. Microsoft, 231 F. Supp. 2d 144
(D.D.C. 2002). This settlement was intended to loosen the monopolistic hold they
had over the software market. Id. It prevented Microsoft from participating in
exclusive deals that could hurt competitors; required Microsoft to offer uniform
contract terms to PC makers; and obliged Microsoft to release some technical
information so that other software developers could write programs compatible
with Windows. Id. Microsoft also had to give manufacturers and customers a way
to remove certain Microsoft icons from the Windows desktop. Id.
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away."'' 49  The FTC is also an independent agency created by the
legislative branch and given relative autonomy. The FTC is more
impervious to the Bush administration's agenda because the five
commissioners hold staggered seven-year terms, and because the
President appointments must vary in their party affiliations.150
C. Recent Tension Boils Over Barnett's September Report on Single-
Firm Conduct.
The most recent controversy between the two agencies relates to
the report Assistant Attorney General Thomas 0. Barnet released on
September 8th, 2008.151 After a yearlong corroboration with the FTC
to study antitrust enforcement under Section 2 with the intent of
creating a cumulative joint report to provide business with consistent
and clear guidelines, the DOJ unilaterally issued its own report
setting forth the DOJ's policy and guidance on the subject. 5 2 On the
149. Goulet, supra note 9, at 273 (quoting David Fischer, FTC Commissioner
Claims DOJ Attorneys Chase Him Away with Torches, Feb. 1, 2007, available at
http://www.antitrustreview.com/archives/83 1).
150. Id.
151. John E. Arden, Barnett Resigns as Justice Department Antitrust Chief,
Trade Regulation Talk, Nov. 7, 2008, available at
http://www.traderegulation.blogspot.com/2008/11 /barnett-resigns-as-justice-
department.html. The Report is entitled, "Competition and Monopoly: Single-Firm
Conduct Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act." Assistant Attorney General
Thomas 0. Barnett was the Justice Department's Antitrust Chief. Id.
152. Goulet, supra note 9, at 268-69. In June 2006, the FTC and the DOJ
began holding a yearlong series of public hearings to study issues related to
enforcement of Section 2. Id. At the hearings, over one hundred participants in
twenty-nine panels would discuss a wide range of topics over nineteen days. Id.
Discussions included the specific types of single-firm conduct, such as predatory
pricing, bundling, tying, and refusals to deal. Id. The study was intended to
conclude with the release of a joint report "drawling] on the rich body of
commentary created during the hearings, judicial precedent, and scholarly
research." Id. (quoting Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice (Sept. 8, 2008),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/press-releases/2008/236975.htm).
Despite the joint undertaking, the DOJ issued its own two hundred thirteen page
report entitled Competition and Monopoly: Single-Firm Conduct Under Section 2
of the Sherman Act. Id.
The unilateral report issued by the DOJ discusses whether and when specific
types of single-firm conduct violate Section 2 by harming competition and
consumer welfare. Arden, supra note 151. More specifically, the report identifies
29-2
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day the DOJ released its report, all four of the FTC commissioners
issued statements harshly attacking Barnett's report for putting the
interest of monopoly power above the interests of consumers and
overstating the level of legal and economic agreement regarding
Section 2.153 One commissioner called it a "blueprint for radically
and discusses the areas of consensus with the FTC with respect to the proper
treatment of single firm conduct. Id. The report goes on to confirm the rebuttable
presumption that monopoly power exists "[w]hen a firm has maintained a market
share in excess of two-thirds for a significant period and its market position would
not likely be eroded in the near future." Id. (quoting DOJ Press Release: Justice
Department Issues Report on Monopoly Law). The DOJ's report continues on that
its primary goal is to set forth clear and administrable standards, and they believe
the current prohibitions are vague or overly inclusive and likely to undermine
economic growth and harm consumers. Id. at 270. These and other findings in the
report confirm the DOJ's preoccupation with the potential chilling effect on
investment and innovation of "over-enforcement" as they would like to call it. Id.
The DOJ's report makes the following sweeping conclusions. Id. The pre se
illegality of tying arrangements should be abandoned, the law's historic hostility to
the practice of tying is unjustified, and the hostility is inconsistent with the U.S.
Supreme Court's modern decisions. Id. Bundling is a common practice and
frequently benefits consumers. Id. Unilateral and unconditional refusals to deal
with rivals should not play a meaningful role in Section 2 enforcement. Id.
Exclusive-dealing arrangements that foreclose less than twenty percent of existing
customers should not be illegal. Id. And finally, the last of these conclusions given
by the DOJ is that, when a firm has been found to violate Section 2, its remedy
should allow it to re-establish the opportunity for competition without
unnecessarily chilling competitive practices, or creating disincentives for
investment and innovation. Id.
153. Id.; Goulet, supra note 9, at 270-72. Commissioners Pamela Jones
Harbour, Jon Leibowitz, and J. James Rosch rejected the DOJ's report by calling it
a "blueprint for radically weakened enforcement of Section 2" that "goes beyond
the holdings of the Supreme Court cases upon which it relies" and "seriously
overstates the level of legal, economic, and academic consensus regarding Section
2." Id. (quoting Statement of Commissioners Harbour, Leibowitz, and Roesch on
the Issuance of the Section 2 Report by the Department of Justice (Sept. 8, 2008),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2008/09/O80908section2stmt.pdf). The FTC
Commissioners' statement further faulted the DOJ for creating broad safe harbors
for dominant firms and imposing rigorous burdens of proof on plaintiffs, which are
nearly impossible to meet with these safe harbors in place. Id. at 271. The
Commissioners conclude that the DOJ's report creates a multilayered protective
screen for dominant firms with monopoly or near-monopoly power. Id. The
Commissioners allege this protective screen will allow dominant firms to engage in
anticompetitive practices with impunity, regardless of the adverse effects it may
have on consumers. Id.
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weakened enforcement of Section 2" that "goes beyond the holdings
of the Supreme Court cases upon which it relies" and "seriously
overstates the level of legal, economic, and academic consensus
regarding Section 2. ' '154 The Commissioners argue the DOJ's report
downplayed the risks of under-enforcement, and the DOJ's
disproportionality test distorts the rule of reason standard. 55 The
Commissioners further assert they are wary of the DOJ's reliance on
economic theory and heed the DOJ to Justice Breyers' recent
warning that while economic theory is an important consideration in
applying antitrust law, it is not tantamount to the law itself.156
FTC Chairman William E. Kovacic issued a separate statement
expressing regret that the laborious hearings had not resulted in a
joint document reflecting their shared views for guiding corporate
American with clear and consistent guidelines on how to
competitively compete. 57 He artfully indicated the DOJ's report
lacked historical context.1 58 Barnett responded to defend the DOJ's
The Commissioners point to four premises they believe the DOJ's report is
based on, and to which they disagree. Id. First, the DOJ believes that monopoly
profits encourage firms to innovate and compete. Goulet, supra note 9, at 270-72.
Second, the risk of over-enforcement is greater than the risk of under-enforcement.
Id. Third, the costs of administration are a factor that should be weighed against
enforcement of Section 2 violations. Id. And finally, there is a need for clear and
administrable tests, and the court has recognized this need and fashioned bright line
tests as a result. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. The disproportionality test requires anticompetitive effects to be
"disproportionately" greater than precompetitive effects. Id. This is an obvious
departure from the rule of reason standard implemented in Standard Oil, which
courts agree laid the foundation for modem antitrust analysis. Goulet, supra note 9,
at 270-72; Kovacic & Shapiro, supra note 34, at 45.
156. Goulet, supra note 9, at 271-72 (citing the Statement of Commissioners
Harbour, Liebowitz and Rosch on the Issuance of the Section 2 Report by the
Department of Justice (Sept. 8, 2008), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2008/09/080908section2stmt.pdf). The Commissioners
rebuke the DOJ's reliance on economic theory as a crutch for under-enforcement
by pointing out Justice Breyer's statement to the contrary. Id.
157. Id. at 272. Chairman Kovacic released his own statement, neither
endorsing nor opposing the report. Id.
158. Id. In his statement, Chairman Kovacic states the DOJ's report lacks "an
appreciation for [historical enforcement] trends ought to inspire caution before one
embraces the proposition that U.S. antitrust doctrine and policy today expose
dominant firms to significant, systematic risks attributable to over-inclusive
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report as being pro-consumer. 59 Days after the reports, presidential
candidate Barack Obama said the DOJ's position on enforcement
highlighted the need for more aggressive antitrust enforcement. 160
Barnett announced his retirement as Chief of the DOJ's Antitrust
Division less than a month later. 16' While deregulation was the
norm under Barnett, government regulation may again play a crucial
role in the protection of competition as the country learns that
liability rules." Id. (quoting Modem U.S. Competition Law and the Treatment of
Dominant Firms: Comments on the Department of Justice and Federal Trade
Commission Proceedings Relation to Section 2 of the Sherman Act 1, 2, 4-5,
(Sept. 8, 2008) (statement of William E. Kovacic, Chairman, Federal Trade
Commission), available at
http://ftc.gov/os/2008/09/08O908section2stmtkovacic.pdf). By his statement,
Kovacic adeptly admonished the DOJ's fear of false positives and over-
enforcement as unfounded. Id.
159. Arden, supra note 151. Barnett re-affirmed his position that the article
reflected the agencies shared view of antitrust enforcement, and maintained that the
report was pro-consumer. Id. He stressed the importance of avoiding interference
in the "rough and tumble of beneficial competition that drives innovation and
economic growth". Goulet, supra note 9, at 274 (quoting Press Release, U.S.
Department of Justice (Sept. 8, 2008), available at Competition Enforcement in an
Innovative Economy, http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/234246.htm).
Barnett insisted the report was "consistent with the overall framework that has been
endorsed by the courts and scholars." Id.
Barnett did, however, conceded that the DOJ's report was not based on the
testimony given by the panelists or even on the scholarly commentary cited in the
report. Id. (citing Thomas 0. Barnett & Hill B. Wellford, The DOJ's Single-Firm
Conduct Report: Promoting Consumer Welfare Through Clear Standards for
Section 2 of the Sherman Act, GCP, Oct. 2008, at 8, available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/238599.pdf). He claimed instead the
report was based on judicial precedent. Id. (citing Barnett, supra note 159, at 11).
He concluded this response by insisting the report was meant to set clear and
articulable standards for Section 2 enforcement and that objective standards were
counterproductive and should be abandoned. Id. (citing Barnett, supra 159, at 15).
160. Goulet, supra note 9, at 276-77. Days after the DOJ released their report,
Obama's campaign told reporters "the Justice Department's position reflected the
need for a more aggressive approach to antitrust enforcement in the next
administration." Id.
161. Id. Barnett's resignation was effective on November 19th, 2008. Id. It
is customary for the assistant attorney general to resign several days after the
election of the next president. Stoll & Goldfein, supra note 11.
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unrestrained markets are not always self-correcting. 62
Consequentially, the DOJ's report may soon be no more than a
footnote in American antitrust jurisprudence. 163
IV. BARACK OBAMA IS LIKELY TO BRING PEACE BETWEEN THE
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION AND THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND
BRING UPON MORE EFFECTIVE ENFORCEMENT OF ANTITRUST LAWS
A. Barack Obama is Expected to Narrow the Rift between the FTC
and the DOJ Making for Clearer and More Consistent Antitrust
Rules.
With the Democrats now in control of both Congress and the
Executive branch, antitrust enforcement is likely to be ramped up in
the new administration."6  In his September 2007 speech to the
American Antirust Institute, President Obama promised he would
reinvigorate antitrust enforcement, ensure the benefits of competition
flowed to consumers, relieve the barriers to entry in the
pharmaceutical industry, prohibit pharmaceutical monopolies from
imposing unjustified price increases, and finally he vowed to
strengthen the agencies that enforce antitrust abuses. 165 Obama's
162. Goulet supra note 9, at 267-77. However, the report is issued as
guidance and to establish rules that are easy to apply, thus it may influence judges
and litigators. Id. at 277.
163. Id.
164. Taylor, supra note 131, at 1, 2. Antitrust activity over the past eight
years has been sluggish. Id. Paul Novak, chair of the antirust department at New
York-based Milberg commented, "I don't think that anyone would characterize the
Bush administration, especially during those last couple of years, as being
aggressive in terms of enforcement efforts, not at the FTC but particularly not at
[the] DOJ." But most people believe the Obama administration will increase
antitrust enforcement. Id. at 14.
165. Stoll & Goldfein, supra note 11 (citing Obama, supra note 1). In his
September 2007 speech, President Obama spoke about reinvigorating antitrust
enforcement by stepping up review of merger activity and curbing those mergers
that hurt consumers while quickly clearing those that do not. Id. Some experts
opine that what Obama meant by "reinvigorate" in his September 2007 speech was
that he would clarify enforcement standards and make those standards consistent
between the DOJ and the FTC. Id. He pledged to give special review to specific
industries to ensure the benefits of competition were being passed on to the
consumer. Id. (citing Obama, supra note 1). He took aim at the pharmaceutical
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policy towards antitrust is described by some as a more careful,
nuanced policy with hard-nosed idealism.166
With Obama in office, most of the changes to antitrust
enforcement will take place at the DOJ. 167 Obama fulfilled the first
step of his promise to ramp up enforcement when he named Christine
Varney as the Assistant Attorney General for the DOJ's Antitrust
Department. 168  She served former President Bill Clinton as a senior
industry and vowed to reduce barriers to entry in this market, while preserving
incentives for pharmaceutical companies to innovate and invent life-saving
medication. Id. He assured he would repeal the antitrust exemption that medical
malpractice insurance and drug insurance companies enjoy so they can't continue
to abuse their monopoly power through unjustified price increases. Id. Lastly, he
pledged to strengthen the DOJ and FTC and take action to ensure antitrust law is
effective and does not undermine efficiency or significantly interfere with
competition to the detriment American consumers or businesses. Id. (citing
Obama, supra note 1).
166. Id. Einer Elhauge, a Harvard University law professor and antirust
advisor to President Obama, described the President as having a "more careful,
nuanced policy . . . [with] a hard-nosed idealism." Id. (citing Amy Miller, The
GC's Choice: Obama, Corporate Counsel, (Jan. 7, 2008) available at
http://www.law.com/jsp/cc/PubArticleCC.jsp?id=900005499868). Experts
describe Obama as a likely champion of American consumers, as well as
considerate of American business interests. Id.
167. Ronald Fink, Obama 's Pick for Antitrust Boss Signals Tougher Stance on
Deals, FINANCIAL WEEK, Feb. 2, 2009, at 1; Stoll & Goldfien, supra note 11. Neal
Stoll and Shepard Goldfein base their assertion on Obama's campaign policy
statements about the major rifts between the DOJ and FTC. Fink, supra, at 1.
Under the last administration, the DOJ was focused more on aggressive cartel
enforcement and abstained from enforcing mergers and overseeing monopolization
threats. Id. The DOJ's aggressive cartel enforcement under Mr. Barnett will
continue under Varney's leadership, as cartel enforcement is an expressed priority
for the new administration. Stoll & Goldfien, supra note 11; Sean Gates & Tej
Srimushnam, United States: New Directors in Antitrust Enforcement: Obama
Appoints Christine Varney to Head DOJ Antitrust Division, MORRISON &
FOERSTER, January 2009 http://www.mofo.com/news/updates/files/15173.html
(last visited Oct. 14, 2009).
168. Caren Bohan, Diane Bratz & Carol Bishopric, Obama Names Varney to
Antitrust Role at Justice, Jan. 22, 2009,
http://www.reuters.com/article/politicsNews/idUSTRE50L7OE20090122 (last
viewed Oct. 14, 2009). During her time at the FTC, Varney was a major innovator
of market theory analysis in both electronic high technology and biotechnology.
Daniel Sokol, It's Official - Varney to Head DOJ Antitrust, ANTITRUST &
COMPETITION POLICY BLOG, Jan. 22, 2009,
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/antitrustprof blog/2009/01/its-official--.html (last
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White House adviser and was one of five members of the FTC from
1994 to 1997.169 She had a record at the FTC as an enforcer, and
experts believe her record will likely change the agency to be more
active in merger challenges and dominant firm investigations. 70
Specifically, Varney is likely to challenge mergers that create barriers
to entry, raise competitors' costs, or facilitate price collusions. 17 1
Moving the DOJ more in line with the present FTC enforcement
agenda is likely to have a positive impact on cooperation and
consolidation between the FTC and DOJ. The unprecedented
appointment of a former FTC Commissioner as Assistant Attorney
General of the DOJ Antitrust Division may perhaps be a very
important move in reconciling the historical tension between the
agencies and make for more clear and consistent rules for lawful
competition.
President Obama appointed Joe Leibowitz Chairman of the FTC
in March 2009.172 Chairman Leibowitz was appointed a
commissioner of the FTC in 2004, and remains the only Democrat in
the Commission. Commissioner Leibowitz is an activist who
encourages vigorous condemnation of anticompetitive conduct,
which may not fall strictly within the confines of the Act.'73 He has
visited Oct. 14, 2009). She also vigorously enforced antitrust laws in the health
care industry. Id. In her opinion, In Re International Conference Interpreters,
Varney wrote for the majority and was praised as both practical and innovative. Id.
Varney has also earned the esteem of the Global Competition Review Chambers
U.S.A., and International Who's Who of Competition Lawyers. Id.
169. Id. This is the first time a former FTC Commissioner will head the
DOJ's antitrust division. Fink, supra note 167, at 1.
170. Stoll & Goldfein, supra note 11; Gates & Srimushnam, supra note 167.
Specifically, experts believe Vamey will take a more aggressive stance on mergers
in innovation-focused industries, mergers involving vertical integration, and
mergers involving privacy issues. Id. She has a reputation of being a fair-minded
enforcer. Bracewell & Giuliant, Antitrust Under President Obama, Jan. 23, 2009,
http://www.bracewellgiuliani.com/index.cfm/fa/news.advisory/item/f4138e67-
2ae4-462e-aeO9-6b8c68af4682/AntitrustUnderPresidentObama.cfm (last
visited Oct. 14, 2009). She voted for the Boeing/McDonald Douglas merger, and
may bring to the DOJ the perfect balance required under the current economic
conditions. Id.
171. Fink, supra note 167, at 1.
172. Id.
173. Caren Bohan, Diane Bratz & Carol Bishopric, supra note 168; Bracewell
& Giuliant, supra note 170. Like Varney, Leibowitz has a reputation as an
29-2
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taken a tough stance against collusion in the pharmaceutical industry.
According to Chairman Liebowitz, stopping pharmaceutical
companies from colluding with their competitors to keep low-cost,
generic drugs off the market is one of the FTC's highest priorities. 174
Obama will have the opportunity to fill the spot of current
Commissioner Pamela Jones Harbour. 175  If Obama chooses a
Democrat to fill her seat, it will give the Democrats a majority in the
FTC. 176  Obama's intent not to deter businesses with overly
aggressive enforcement may temper what some commentators
believe is the recent zealous enforcement of the FTC. 17 7 President
Obama is expected to be a moderating force between the FTC and
enforcer of antitrust law. Id. He recently rallied for the increase use of Section 5
of the Act to prohibit anticompetitive conduct, which does strictly fall within the
parameters of the Act. Id. Leibowitz has also suggested that the judiciary,
especially the Supreme Court, is adverse to enforcing antitrust law. Id. He also
suggests the FTC should seek disgorgement, the forced relinquishment of profits
earned from illegal acts, in the pharmaceutical industry. Id. He asserts that,
"malefactors should not keep the ill-gotten gains of their illegal acts." Id.
174. Leibowitz, supra note 137.
175. Stoll & Goldfein, supra note 11. The executive branch generally exhibits
less influence over the FTC because the appointments are seven years long and no
more than three of the commissioners can be from the same party. Id. This is one
reason the FTC remained an aggressive agency under the Bush administration,
perhaps it even became overly aggressive in response to the lax enforcement at the
DOJ. Id.
176. Id. There will be an open spot to fill in the fall of 2009, when
Commissioner Pamela Jones Harbour completes her seven year term with the FTC.
177. Id. Some argue the FTC has become too aggressive. Obama's
appointment might help to tamper the FTC's recent aggressive trend. Id. The
recent trend comes in light of the DOJ's ineffectiveness as an enforcement agency
and their sympathy of big business. Id. The FTC has evolved itself to catch what
the DOJ has let slip through the holes, or even outwardly protected. Goulet, supra
note 11, at 273. (characterizing the DOJ's enforcement policy as pro big business).
However, Varney is likely to ramp up enforcement, lessening the demand for a
more aggressive FTC. Stoll & Goldfein, supra note 11.
The FTC has made some suspect decisions in regard to procedure that has
sparked some to call the agency a "win at all costs" agency. Id. One of those
decisions, was the FTC's appointment of Commissioner Rosch to serve as
administrative law judge for complaints brought by the commission. Id. The FTC
also imposed a regulation removing federal courts from the process of reviewing
initial mergers. Id. Both the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the American Bar
Association Antitrust section have filed opposition statements arguing a lack of
procedural fairness. Id.
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DOJ, whom have historically had turf issues.178 With the
appointment of Varney, Liebowitz, and a fifth commissioner, experts
are hopeful that the two agencies will have an easier time working
together to create more consistent and predictable antitrust
policies. 179
B. Economic Circumstances May Humble High Expectations.
While increased attention to antitrust enforcement will be placed
on both the DOJ and FTC, there might not be radical change
immediately.1 80 The Administration's tougher stance on enforcement
might be pushed to the backburner as the President has to take care of
more pressing issues like our domestic and global financial crisis. 81
Deals are falling apart in these difficult economic times, not because
of antitrust agencies, but because money is tight virtually
everywhere. 82 Some believe, during tough economic times, antitrust
178. Stoll and Goldfein, supra note 11, at 4. During the Bush Administration,
the DOJ and FTC drifted apart from each other and each closer to an extreme. Id.
The DOJ moved to be a more hands off agency when it came to mergers and
monopolies, and they to a large extent protected large corporations instead of
consumers. Id. The FTC in turn became the more aggressive agency and may
have overcompensated in some cases for the DOJ's ineffectiveness. Id. Carl
Hittinger, DLA Piper in the Philadelphia office, commented that Varney might
have moderating effect on the two agencies that have had turf issues in the past.
Fink, supra note 167.
179. Fink, supra note 167, at 4. Obama's views on Section 2 are more in line
with that of the FTC. Id. Obama stated his common view with the FTC that the
DOJ's lack of enforcement of Section 2 under the Bush administration was a major
problem. Id. The DOJ's move toward the FTC's line of thinking in terms of
mergers and dominant-firm enforcement should foster consensus and cooperation
between the two agencies. Id. at 5.
180. Stoll & Goldfein, note 11. Neal R. Stoll and Shepard Goldfein opine
there would be the kind of radical change the public is expecting. Id. Since the
Obama administration urges a centrist approach to both agencies, the DOJ's
laissez-faire enforcement may move toward a moderately less-aggressive policy
more like the one employed at the FTC. Id.
181. Bracewell & Giuliant, supra note 170.
182. Taylor, supra note 131, at 15 (referring to Larry Fullerton, who leads the
antitrust department of Chicago's Sidley & Austen). Of course, despite tight times,
the consolidation craze continued. Id
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is the first thing to be cut in terms of regulatory compliance. 83 Most
recently, the government's approval of recent banking mergers may
indicate regulators are taking a back seat to economic strategists who
hope to save jobs by keeping failing companies in business.' 84
Therefore, expectations for tougher antitrust enforcement might
diminish of the U.S. economy's downward spiral.185
Former FTC official Hart Holden urges that, despite differing
philosophies, the new administration has about big business, the
Obama Administration is unlikely to clamp down on big mergers.' 86
He emphasizes that the Executive Branch ultimately has limited
influence over the FTC because of the five commissioners, no more
183. Brian Wingfield, Obama's Antitrust Dilemma, FORBES.coM, Feb. 2,
2009, http://www.forbes.com/2009/02/01/obama-antitrust-regulation-technology-
enterprise_0201_antitrust.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2009). Companies may expect
the Obama administration to ease up on antitrust enforcement as the unemployment
number rises. Id. Franklin D. Roosevelt, although being a zealous proponent of
antitrust enforcement, suspended federal antitrust law in 1933 when he enacted the
National Industry Recovery Act. Id. Further, the U.S. airline industry received a
limited antirust break after the September 11 th attacks. Id.
184. Id. Despite Obama's intentions, some experts believe the country is
going to see a movement towards industry consolidation in order to keep
companies in business and to keep unemployment from sky rocketing. Id.
Washington insiders, however, "caution not to count you deals until they are
approved." Id.
185. Caren Bohan, Diane Bratz & Carol Bishopric, supra note 168. Antitrust
enforcement is generally low during times of economic woes because many of
those companies risk bankruptcy if they do not merge. Id. Experts believe that
given the fragility of the present economy, antitrust enforcement will be a low
priority for the Obama administration. Id. Albert Foer, President of the American
Antitrust Institute, argues that once credit loosens up, companies facing stiff
competition will seek to buy up rivals in the still weak economy. Id.
186. The Deal.com, Former FTC Official: Fears of Obama Meddling in
Mergers Greatly Exaggerated, Nov. 11, 2008, at 1, available at
http://finance.intomobile.com/intomobile?GUID=7134437&Page=MEDIAVIEWE
R. Holden was a former official at the FTC for fifteen years before he entered
private practice. Id.
767
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than three can be from the same party. 187 The Pfizer-Wyeth deal will
likely be an early test for the Obama antitrust team. 1 88
Former DOJ Antitrust Division Chief Hew Pate warns that
assertions that the new administration will relax antitrust enforcement
are "overblown."' 89 According to Pate, the antitrust enforcement
agencies have the task of determining whether less competition will
harm consumers; preventing job loss is never a goal of antirust1 90 In
fact, the weak economy may spur regulators to watch even more
closely for signs of emerging cartels and efforts to fix prices.' 91
Harsh economic times often encourage competitors to merge or
make agreements with one another preserving their cumulated
survival. When the economy rebounds and these trusts persist, the
consequence is large market power held in the hands of too few. It is
a trap for antitrust enforcement agencies to lower the bar on
enforcement because businesses claim bankruptcy will ensue, but this
not an excuse according to Standard Oil.'92 Without a skeptical eye
during a weak economy, menacing mergers can fly under the radar of
antitrust enforcers, only to resurface years later as dominant firms
with monopoly power threatening consumer welfare. Change will
187. Id. Holden believes that whoever Obama appoints as Assistant Attorney
General of the Antitrust Division of the DOJ will likely come to the same
conclusions that the Bush administration did. Id.
188. Brent Kendall, Pfizer-Wyeth Deal An Early Test For Obama Antitrust
Policy, Dow Jones News, Jan. 26, 2009 available at
http://www.advfn.com/newsPfizer-Wyeth-Deal-An-Early-Test-For-Obama-
Antitrust-Policy.35971605.html. Pfizer proposed a $68 billion deal to acquire
their competitor Wyeth. Id. This would be the largest pharmaceutical merger since
2000 when Glaxo Wellcome PLC acquired SmithKline Beechman PLC. Id. The
FTC approved of the Glaxo-SmithKline merger on the condition the companies
would agree to divestiture in six product markets where there was overlapping
offerings. Id.
189. Wingfield, supra note 183. Pate responds to some commentators' view
that the banking industry was overlooked by antitrust enforcement. Id. He
properly reasons banking deals, such as the Bank of America and Merrill Lynch
merger and the Wells Fargo and Wachovia merger, would have received the
government's approval after a lengthy antitrust review because the banking
industry is not highly concentrated. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 74. The Supreme Court ordered the divestiture
of Standard Oil, despite the defendants' argument that the order would bankrupt it.
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come; however, it will likely be progressive rather than sudden, and
moderate rather than revolutionary.' 93 Thus, change will likely be
seen in those areas that were under-enforced over the last eight
years. 1 94
Government creates these monopolies when it is too lenient, then
prosecutes when these firms become too good, too profitable, and too
dominant. This cycle can be broken by heightened scrutiny when the
economy is weak. Decisive actions may be harsh in the short term,
such as letting firms go bankrupt instead, but these actions will
benefit consumers two-fold in decades to come when competition is
effectively protected. After all, antitrust is designed to protect
competition, not competitors, not employees, and certainly not big
business.
V. CONCLUSION.
This comment began by introducing the background of antitrust
law in the United States. 195 It explored why antitrust law was needed
to protect consumers from firms that used their domination in the
market to fix prices, stall innovation, and restrict supply.1 96 Congress
passed the Act with the intention of creating a law that would protect
consumer welfare and evolve with our economic understanding of
the market.' 97 Courts, legislators, and the executive have struggled
for decades to strike a balance between the interests of dominant
firms and the interests of consumers. 198
The last eight years are evidence this struggle continues. The
Bush Administration had the lowest enforcement rate of antitrust
offenses in the last century, and it has had a shocking effect on our
market. 199 A stunning example is that consumer healthcare costs
skyrocketed in response to the high merger rate of the pharmaceutical
193. Bracewell & Giuliant, supra note 170.
194. Fink, supra note 167, at 1.
195. See supra Part II; The Deal.com, supra note, 186.
196. See supra Part II.
197. See supra Part B1; BORK, supra note 7, at 50.
198. Id.
199. Obama, supra note 1.
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industry.20 0  Experts of both political persuasions accuse the Bush
Administration's DOJ of being too lenient towards mergers and
putting the interests of big business ahead of the interests of
consumers. 20 1  Few defend the DOJ's position that letting big
business thrive unfettered is beneficial to the consumer. However,
those that do would argue it provides better economies of scale,
lower prices, and enables the firm to better compete with foreign
industry.20 2
In an attempt to make up for the DOJ's laissez-faire attitude, the
FTC arguably has become overly-aggressive in pursuing Section 5
abuses. The FTC was designed to merely fill the gaps in the DOJ's
enforcement policy; however, the chasm left by the DOJ forced the
FTC to become the more aggressive agency, thus prosecuting where
the DOJ refused to. The two agencies have conflicting policies on
enforcement and cannot cooperate. Consequentially, corporate
America is left with unclear and inconsistent guidelines of how to
lawfully compete.
It is vital that there be corroboration and cooperation between the
agencies, otherwise, corporate America is left with unclear and
inconsistent guidelines of how to lawfully compete. For the first time
in history, Varney, a former FTC commissioner, will be the head of
the DOJ. Having predicable outcomes will enable firms to compete
more efficiently, without the fear of prosecution; efficient
competition is always in the best interest of the consumer.
The economic downturn will have an effect on the new
administration's ramped up enforcement of antitrust law. That effect,
however, should not deter enforcement agencies from effectively
200. Id.
201. No more than three of the five Commissioners can be from the same
political party. Renee M. Jones, "Legitimacy and Corporate Law: The Case for
Regulatory Redundancy" 86 WASH. U. L. REv. 1273, 1310 (2009). And all four
members; William E. Kovacic, Pamela Jones Harbour, Jon Leibowitz, and J.
Thomas Rosch; harshly criticized the DOJ's antitrust policies as too lenient
towards mergers and as putting the interests of big business ahead of the interest of
consumers. See supra notes 160-61.
202. Economies of scale refer to the concept that when a firm increases their
production of a certain item, their relative cost per unit decreases. This
phenomenon is behind the notion that larger firms are more efficient because the
cost it takes to produce one unit of something is less presumable because the larger
finn has more resources.
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doing their job because, in hard economic times, mergers and
dominant firm conduct require even more scrutiny. Laissez-faire
enforcement is very dangerous, as it allows firms to collude and
consolidate. While these firms may defend their actions as necessary
to avoid bankruptcy, they fly under the radar only to resurface as
monopolies when the economy has rebounded.

